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PACE, AMANDA:  The Chinese Government’s Implementation of Soft and Hard Power Policies 
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Today there is an increasing unrest among the minority populations of China and 
the government enforces different policies both to encourage assimilation and enforce 
order within minority regions.  My research compares two different minority regions in 
China, Xinjiang and Tibet, and examines Beijing’s education, language and religious 
policies within these two minority regions. Beijing uses special mechanisms to 
implement these policies. I categorize these different policy realms according to their 
relative power. I find that in order to achieve desired objectives, Beijing will either 
enforce strict laws or fairly lenient laws depending on the policy realm. I argue that 
Beijing uses a method of ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’ policies within the different 
realms. ‘Soft power’ policies are typically more covert in terms of their objectives and 
implementation. Beijing uses the subtle powers of persuasion and positive incentives to 
shift people’s mindsets. I use the term ‘hard power’ policy to describe more 
straightforward policies. These policies tend to use force or scare tactics to enforce the 
policy, such as bans and restrictions. Although there is no direct proof to explain why 
Beijing uses these distinct policy approaches, I speculate as to why Beijing utilizes these 
policies in different circumstances.   
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                                              Introduction  
On July 5th, 2009, a series of violent riots over several days broke out in the 
Xinjiang Autonomous Region’s capital city of Urumqi. The first day of the riots began as 
a peaceful protest with at least 1,000 Uighur nationalists. However, the peaceful protest 
quickly turned into a bloody and violent uprising. How did this peaceful protest escalate 
into a series of violent attacks between the Han (“ethnic Chinese”) and the Uighur 
people? Rioting began when the Peoples Republic of China sent a large police force to 
Urumqi to disperse the protest and called for a full investigation of the Shaoguan 
incident in southern China that occurred several days before the riot. During this brawl, 
two Uighur men who worked in a toy factory were killed when a group of Han workers 
murdered the men on the basis of a rumor that the two Uighur men allegedly sexually 
assaulted a Han female worker (Wong, 2009). Once the Uighur in Xinjiang heard of the 
murders, they began peacefully protesting in Urumqi, demanding for official action over 
the unjust murders. No one can say who truly began the violence; the Uighur claim it 
was the police and the police claim it was the protestors. The PRC believed that the riots 
themselves were planned from abroad by the World Uighur Congress and its leader, 
Rebiya Kadeer (Wong, 2009). The Chinese government began researching an “anti-
terrorist” law after the terrorist attack on the U.S. on September 11, 2001 and began 
developing the law after this riot since it was viewed as a terrorist attack.1 For this 
reason, the actions of the police may have been more aggressive than necessary. There 
                                                          
1
 "“9•11”八周年，中国呼唤《反恐法》." Xinhua: 新华网. 11 Sept. 2009. Web. 20 Oct. 2011. 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2009-09/11/content_12033506.htm>. 
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were a total of 197 deaths, 1,700 reported injuries, and many destroyed buildings.2 
Uighur exile groups claim that the Chinese government lessened the death toll for their 
own purposes and that there was in fact a much greater death toll. Following the riots, 
the PRC police force conducted a wide-scale sweep of Urumqi looking for any Uighur 
who was involved in the riots or thought to of planned the protest. Many men and 
women disappeared following this wide-scale sweep of the city.  In the weeks following 
the riots, over 1,000 Uighurs were arrested and detained, mosques were temporarily 
closed and the PRC placed armed policemen within the city until January 2010. Many of 
the prisoners were faced with criminal charges and over 30 people faced execution. 
There have been many riots within Xinjiang on the basis of unjust treatment of minority 
nationalities and fighting for religious freedom. 
Many of the riots within Xinjiang are comparable to the riots that have taken 
place within the Tibet Autonomous Region. For example, in 2008, the Tibetans began a 
series of riots, protests and demonstrations within Lhasa, the capital city. The 
demonstration began as an observance of the Tibetan Uprising Day, a day in which the 
Tibetan people celebrate the 1959 Tibetan uprising against the presence of Chinese rule 
within Tibet. The demonstration quickly turned into a series of violent riots where 
monks and Tibetan citizens attacked Han civilians and created havoc within the city. The 
PRC police force promptly intervened to prevent even more damage and arrested and 
detained many Tibetan citizens. The Chinese government blamed these riots on 
                                                          
2
 " Xinjiang Crippled by Urumqi Riots; Curfew Set | Xinjiang: Far West China." , Travel to Xinjiang, China | 
Far West China. 5 July 2009. Web. 23 Oct. 2011. 
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separatism and claimed that the Dalai Lama organized the protests. The Dalai Lama 
denied these accusations and blamed the riots on the widespread discontent among the 
Tibetan people. Like the Uighur in Xinjiang, many Tibetan rioters were arrested, 
detained and some were executed.3 These two examples of riots are not unique cases of 
protesting; in fact, there have been at least one riot each year in Xinjiang from 1988-
2001. In addition, in 1996 and 1997 there was a riot nearly every month (see Appendix).  
The vast amount of riots presents a real problem for Beijing. 
In regards to the national minorities in China, Beijing’s goals are to unify all 
minority groups under one nation. Beijing is trying to achieve unification by influencing 
all citizens to speak Mandarin, improving living standards, promoting Han culture, 
among other methods. However, many of China’s minority groups still remain 
unassimilated into Chinese society and the dominant Han culture. These minority 
groups are still not a fully integral part of the Chinese nation for many different reasons. 
One concern about the lack of integration is that the Chinese government fears 
that a national security issue may arise if the minority groups remain unassimilated. In 
Xinjiang specifically, Beijing fears Uighur connection with Pan-Turkic culture across parts 
of Central Asia and its geographic proximity. The Uighur identity is associated with 
Turkic culture and this presents a problem for Beijing. Beijing clearly wants the Uighur 
people to see the positives of Han culture and is afraid that the Uighur will want to 
separate from China to connect with a culture more similar to their own. Another 
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 "Tibetan Riots Spread outside Region - The New York Times." The New York Times - Breaking News, 
World News & Multimedia. Web. 19 Nov. 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/world/asia/16iht-
tibet.4.11148124.html?pagewanted=all>. 
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reason Beijing wants Xinjiang unified with the rest of China is because of its geographical 
location. Xinjiang borders Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Xinjiang’s location is extremely important for national 
security because it serves as a buffer zone between China and these countries. 
Beijing also worries a great deal about Tibet and how to unify its minority 
nationality with the rest of China. The Chinese government fears that Tibetan identity 
has an unbreakable link to transnational ties of Tibetan and other Buddhist cultures. 
Today, the CCP and many Han citizens believe religion is a backwards notion. Tibetan 
Buddhism is such a powerful part of Tibetan identity and it is for this reason that Beijing 
fears both the lack of assimilation and even the threat of separatism. The Tibetan 
people also have a powerful leader in the Dalai Lama and Beijing fears that he will unify 
the people and seek greater autonomy. China wants to unify these groups under one 
nation so there are no chances of separatism. 
On the other hand, the CCP’s assimilation policies can create a backlash and 
achieve just the opposite of its intended effect. Since many minority groups in China 
perceive Beijing’s unification attempts as trying to erase their culture, many people have 
participated in various forms of resistance. The most severe form of resistance are riots 
and protests, while there are also more subtle forms of resistance like forming 
allegiances and declaring loyalty to groups other than the government. The Chinese 
government faces a major issue when dealing with promoting assimilation of minority 
nationalities with China. Beijing knows that they must tread lightly when it comes to 
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assimilation policies. The process is a balancing act in that Beijing must allow the 
survival of minority cultural traits while still protecting the nation and not letting it 
become the basis for varying loyalties. The Chinese government must keep their 
interests the number one priority and it is extremely difficult to manage this balancing 
act. Beijing wants to improve the living standards of underprivileged minority citizens 
while also subtly altering their allegiance to China. How can China try and assimilate the 
minority nationalities without these groups reacting negatively? For example, if the 
Chinese government makes all minority schools celebrate a Chinese national holiday to 
introduce the minority students to Han culture, the minority groups could see this as an 
attempt to replace their own holidays. This balancing act is truly difficult and the 
Chinese government has created different systems in which they deal with this issue. 
Beijing approaches assimilation differently depending on the policy realm. For 
example, the government does not handle religious policies and economic policies in 
the same manner. Within these varying realms Beijing uses special mechanisms to 
implement these policies. I categorize these different policy realms according to their 
relative power. To achieve desired objectives, the PRC will either enforce strict laws or 
fairly lenient laws depending on the realm. 
I argue that Beijing uses a method of soft power and hard power policies within 
the different realms. Soft power policies are typically very subtle and more covert when 
implemented. Beijing uses the subtle powers of persuasion and positive incentives to 
shift people’s ideas and mindset. I use the term hard power policy to describe strict 
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policies that state clearly what the objective is. These policies tend to use force or scare 
tactics to enforce the policy. Bans and restrictions are also associated with hard power 
policies. This idea of soft and hard power policies is similar to the “carrot or the stick” 
idiom in that the soft power policies often use positive incentives and the hard power 
policies use strict restrictions with sanctions. Another difference between soft and hard 
power policies is the difference in flexibility. Hard power policies are generally inflexible 
because these policies use clear and distinct restrictions or bans that cannot be 
negotiated. Soft power policies are more flexible because the government is not as strict 
within its implementation. In Beijing’s case, education and language policies are two 
examples of soft power policies and religion is an example of a hard power policy. The 
government giving extra points to minority students on the Chinese college entrance 
exam, the GaoKao, is an example of a soft power education policy because it provides 
incentives for minority groups to want a proper education and participate in Chinese 
society. Banning pictures and religious icons of the Dalai Lama from Tibetan households 
are a hard power religious policy because there is a clear restriction. Another reason it is 
a hard power policy is because if Tibetan citizens are caught with these images, the 
government can use imprisonment as a form of punishment. 
Although there is no direct proof that Beijing uses this distinction as a 
comparison of policies, I am going to take a stab as to why there are soft power policies 
and hard power policies. One possible explanation is that the Chinese government 
decides to use soft power or hard power policies depending on whether there is a threat 
or not. Two of Beijing’s greatest fears are threats to national security and separatism. 
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Religion presents a problem for the Chinese government in regards to both national 
security and separatist thoughts. If the government sees any signs of these threats, they 
will use hard power policies to eradicate the problem. Since China is a Communist 
nation, the government does not want a large religious presence that could potentially 
undermine their authority. Religion consists of hierarchical, organized groups that tend 
to have ambitious and influential spiritual leaders. The Chinese government fears these 
organizations because they worry that the people will look towards religious groups for 
different services that the government is supposed to provide; for example, education 
or monetary help. Beijing worries that the people will profess their allegiance to specific 
religious groups rather than to the government. Religion is a threat to the Chinese 
nation because religious follower’s loyalties to the organizations are very strong. This 
loyalty is so strong because people usually connect themselves to just one specific 
religion; there are rarely cases where someone professes allegiance to Roman 
Catholicism and Judaism. Different European nations experienced similar issues in 
history when the authority of the different rulers was challenged by large religious 
organizations like the Vatican. The Chinese government implements hard power 
religious policies to avoid these issues. 
Education and language policies are soft power policies because education and 
language realms do not present as much of a threat. There are no threats when it comes 
to the use of language because there are few formal language organizations like religion 
that could undermine the government’s authority. Also, unlike religion, there is no limit 
to how many languages someone can speak and use; therefore, language does not 
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present a real threat. Education presents little of a threat because the school system is 
controlled by the government; therefore, there are few alternative and organized 
sources of formal education outside the purview of the CCP. Another reason that 
educational policies are soft power policies is because Beijing understands that most 
citizens want a decent education to improve their living standards so they will not 
jeopardize this. Soft power policies and hard power policies are implemented depending 
upon whether the government believes something to be a threat to their authority or 
national security. Beijing will use hard power policies when there are signs that a 
minority group’s loyalty and allegiance lies with a group other than the Chinese 
government. 
                                          Case Study and Background 
For my thesis, I decided to look at two of China’s most controversial minority 
groups; the Uighur of Xinjiang and the Tibetans of Tibet. Both the Uighur and Tibetans 
pose a threat to China’s national security for different reasons. Beijing has implemented 
many different policies within Xinjiang and Tibet to promote Han culture and unify these 
groups with the rest of the nation. I use the distinction between soft power and hard 
power policies when comparing Beijing’s education, language and religious policies 
within Xinjiang and Tibet. 
There are 56 recognized ethnic groups within China; the Han Chinese account for 
91.59% of the overall Chinese population and the other minority nationalities make up 
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the 8.41% of the population.4 Although these groups make up a small percentage of the 
population, they are distributed extensively throughout the country. Most of the 
minority nationalities reside in the Southwest, Northwest and Northeast of China. I 
chose to research the Uighur minority in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region and the 
Tibetan minority in the Tibet Autonomous Region specifically. The Uighur are regionally 
concentrated within China’s West in the XAR and make up about half the population of 
Xinjiang. The XAR is an extremely important region because it borders Russia, Mongolia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India and has many natural 
resources. The Uighur minority are a predominantly Muslim community with ties to 
Central Asia. The Uighur language sounds more like the Turkish languages than Chinese. 
The Uighur, being Turkic, “are as physically distinguishable from Han as African 
Americans are from their European American counterparts” (Kaltman, 2007: 2). The 
Uighur identity is very much linked to Islam and the Uighur language. According to Eric 
Hyer, “Xinjiang is culturally, linguistically, and historically part of a Turkish civilization 
distinct from the civilization that developed in China. The Turkic-Muslims of Xinjiang 
have never fully assimilated into Chinese culture in the same way that many other 
minority nationalities in China have. The growth of Islamic nationalism as a 
transnational force makes this nationalist movement in Xinjiang especially challenging 
for Beijing” (Hyer, 2006: 80).  Like Xinjiang, the Tibet Autonomous Region is also 
                                                          
4 "Chinese Ethnic Groups, Nationalities, Han People, Ethnic Minority." China Travel Agency,China 
Tours,Beijing Tour Packages,24/7 Service. Web. 19 Nov. 2011. 
<http://www.travelchinaguide.com/intro/nationality/>. 
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concentrated in the Western region of China and borders Nepal, India, Burma and 
Bhutan. Tibet is the traditional homeland of the Tibetan minority. Their language is 
classified as a Tibeto-Burman language because it most closely resembles the Burmese 
language.  The major religion practiced is Tibetan Buddhism and it is extremely 
important to the Tibetan people since it is the number one characteristic that defines 
their identity. The Dalai Lama is the religious leader of Tibetan people and has been 
condemned as a terrorist by the Chinese government. Beijing fears that the Dalai Lama 
will organize the people and fight for greater autonomy or even separatism. The Uighur 
and Tibetans have unique identities unlike any other group of people within China. 
Beijing wants to incorporate these two minority groups into the Chinese nation to 
better their livelihoods and to protect Beijing’s interests. 
                                                                        
                                                                 Education 
The Chinese government has promoted a good education system for both the 
Tibetan and Uighur population for multiple reasons. The first and most obvious reason is 
that the Chinese want all citizens of China to have a proper education. The second and 
more debatable reason is that the Chinese government wants to influence the minds of 
the young minorities in order to bring more of a unity to the nation and convince the 
minority youth of the benefits of Han culture. Grose argues that “state-sponsored 
education has been a priority of the CCP in an attempt to unify all minorities in China 
into one Chinese nation” (Grose, 2010: 97). The Chinese government is willing to 
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implement soft power policies because the state controls the education system in all 
regions so it is less of a threat. Second, the Chinese government knows that most people 
want a better livelihood and the primary way to achieve that is through a decent 
education. Many scholars argue that by giving the minority citizens opportunities for a 
decent education, the Chinese government is portrayed as saviors; therefore, the 
government is able to sneak in some ulterior motives without being criticized. The 
government uses soft power policy techniques such as incentives and persuasion to 
achieve their goals. 
The Chinese government has focused on improving the education standards for 
all minority nationalities for many years. Article 46 of the Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China adopted in 1982 states that “citizens of the People’s Republic of China 
have the duty as well as the right to receive education. The state promotes the all-round 
moral, intellectual, and physical development of children and young people.”5 However, 
some scholars argue that “the ultimate goal for the PRC’s educational policy for minority 
peoples has been to integrate all ethnic groups into a single and unified socialist state” 
(Grose, 2010: 97). Grose argues that “state-sponsored education is one of the CCP’s 
most valuable tools for instilling minority students with ‘pro-Chinese’ principles” (Grose, 
2010: 97). There can be no way of telling what the CCP’s primary goal is when dealing 
with educational policies. There is no denying the fact that the Chinese government 
wants to improve the education in all minority areas; however, the reason for wanting 
                                                          
5
  “CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA." People's Daily Online - Home Page. Web. 19 
Nov. 2011. <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html>. 
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to improve the education for minorities is debated among many scholars. Regardless of 
its ultimate objective, the Chinese government has implemented soft power policies 
when it comes to education policies because education does not pose a threat to 
China’s national security. 
The Chinese government has implemented a number of preferential policies for 
minority students in Xinjiang. One of the biggest policies is the lowering of the standards 
on the college entrance exam (GaoKao) that minorities have to meet. This gives minority 
students a bit of an advantage over their Han peers when applying for universities in 
China. The CCP has also instituted a quota system at the universities in Xinjiang for 
minority students (Grose, 2010: 101).  Uighurs who graduate from the min kao han 
Chinese boarding school and have two Uighur parents will receive 200 bonus points on 
their college entrance exam; those with one Uighur parent will receive 100 bonus points 
(Grose, 2010: 101). The CCP has also allocated several education subsidies to Xinjiang. In 
2006, one education subsidy provided 10 billion RMB to rural areas in Western China to 
improve schools. The CCP is also encouraging Uighur parents to send their children to 
Chinese boarding schools in the Eastern part of China (Grose, 2010: 101). 
Another preferential policy implemented in 2001 is called the “Xinjiang Class”, a 
program that funds middle school-aged students from Xinjiang, mostly ethnic Uighurs, 
to attend school in predominately Han populated cities located throughout Eastern 
China (Grose, 2010: 97). The Xinjiang Class was modeled closely after the program 
created in 1982 that funds Tibetan children to study at boarding schools in Eastern 
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China. The Xinjiang Class is a four year boarding school specifically designed to educate 
poor, Uighur youth from rural Xinjiang. This program was created to provide Uighurs 
with a more complete education and to have better qualified teachers. The first year is 
composed of preparatory studies meant to improve Chinese and English language skills, 
Math, Physics, and Chemistry. After the first year, the Uighur students begin their 
normal coursework for all of which Mandarin is the language of instruction (Grose, 2010: 
101). The Administration Office of the Xinjiang Class selects students based on several 
criteria; a quota system based on ethnicity, residence, and the family’s finances. The 
second factor to being selected for the Xinjiang Class is by their performance on a test 
administered specifically for the Xinjiang Class, which costs about 35-42 RMB to take. 
Starting in 2007, applicants who participate in the “Loving my Chinese Nation” bilingual 
speech competition can earn 5-15 additional points on the exam. In addition, students 
from families who obey the birth control policy or students who are an only child will 
receive five extra points on exam. Finally, students applying for the Xinjiang Class must 
undergo a physical exam (Grose, 2010: 101). 80% of the Xinjiang Class’s students are 
from poor, rural areas. The stated goals of the Xinjiang Class are written under Article 1 
of the Administration Regulations for the Xinjiang Class. This article states, “in order for 
Xinjiang to train qualified high school graduates who support the CCP’s leaders, love 
China, love socialism, defend the unity of China… and are determined to offer one’s self 
for socialist modernization construction , the Xinjiang Class must fully carry out the 
national education and ethnic group policies (and) carry out quality education” (Grose, 
2010: 132). Grose acknowledges that the political goals seem to outshine the 
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educational goals. Grose also argues that the Xinjiang Class has done the opposite of its 
intended goals and “strengthened some Uighur students’ sense of ethnic identity and 
has accentuated the tensions existing between Han and Uighurs” (Grose, 2010: 98). 
What are the real goals of the Xinjiang Class? Is it to truly provide a better 
education for the Uighur youth or is it to influence the young minds of Uighur children 
to support Han culture? The Chinese government desires achieving both goals. Wang 
Dan, an ethnic Han history teacher employed by Jiangsu Province’s Xinjiang Class School, 
confirms that one of his most important responsibilities is to cultivate nationalism 
among the Uighur students. He uses the “curious phrase qianyi mohua, which can be 
loosely translated as influencing someone without their knowledge, to describe his 
teaching objectives” (Grose, 2010: 102). Regardless of the CCP’s true intentions, the 
Xinjiang Class presents a great opportunity for rural, poor Uighur children to receive an 
education. The providing of the Uighur youth with an inexpensive education “has been 
portrayed in the Chinese media as the CCP acting as a kind parent” (Grose, 2010: 103). 
Many Uighur parents struggle when making the decision to send their children to a 
Chinese boarding school because they know that their child will lose a sense of their 
Uighur identity. Providing a good, inexpensive education for the Uighur youth is clearly a 
soft power policy implemented by the Chinese government because it is based on 
incentives and utilizes subtle persuasion to introduce Han culture to the children. The 
different lessons taught in the Xinjiang Class schools are selected to favor Han culture, 
history and language. Also, by providing a good education for the Uighur children, the 
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Chinese government hopes that the Uighur students will feel a sense of gratitude 
towards the Chinese government. 
China’s education plans for Xinjiang have improved the education system 
immensely. Grose notes that “from 1982 to 1990, the percentage of China’s Uighur 
population who attended primary school increased from 37% to 43% and those who 
attended undergraduate college increased from 0.1% to 2.1%. During the same eight-
year span, illiteracy within the Uighur population also decreased from 45 to 26.6%. 
Furthermore, by 2001, 97% of all ‘school-aged’ children in Xinjiang were enrolled in 
school, and 61.8% of total in-school students were minorities” (Grose, 2010: 99). By 
giving the Uighur population better educational opportunities, the Chinese government 
is able to make compromises. The Chinese government is able to select what is being 
taught within these schools to assist their unification goals. Selecting specific 
information to be taught in the Xinjiang schools are a great example of a soft power 
policy used by the PRC to influence the minds of Uighur youth to favor Han culture and 
language. The CCP also publicizes atheism and selected Xinjiang histories within Xinjiang 
schools. The Uighur students are taught what the Chinese government wants them to 
learn. This is extremely typical of any unitary education system. The Uighur youth are 
influenced by the lessons they are taught in school and there is a real fear that they will 
lose their Uighur identity. 
Improving the quality of education in Tibet is a big priority for the Chinese 
government. Before 1950, Tibet did not have any schools for learning other than the 
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monasteries that only taught future nuns and monks the principles and teachings of 
Tibetan Buddhism. Chinese occupation brought education to the average Tibetan child. 
The Chinese government changed the definition of education for the Tibetan people. 
Before Chinese occupation, Tibetans believed that a proper education consisted of 
religious learning. Today, the Tibetan education system consists of language, history, 
mathematics, and science courses. Before, Tibetan education was controlled by the 
monasteries; today, the government has complete control and power over the 
education system which allows Beijing to implement soft power policies. 
Beijing began developing the education system within Tibet by the late 1950’s 
and mid 1960’s. The first priority was to establish and fund primary schools for the 
Tibetan youth. In the late 1970’s, the TAR built four prestigious college-level institutions. 
Since there were new schools that provided a proper education, the Chinese 
government placed Han children living in the TAR within the same schools as the 
Tibetan students. This exposed the Tibetan children to Han culture. This is a soft power 
policy because the Tibetan children were introduced to Han culture at such a young age. 
The typical classes taught within these schools were language courses, science, math, 
history, agriculture, and Maoist ideas. By teaching Maoist ideology in the schools, the 
government is able to subtly introduce the Tibetan children to Communistic ideals. By 
the 1980’s, there were more state funded schools, more subsidies provided for the 
poorer students, and more schools that allowed boarding for the students who lived too 
far away to make the daily commute. The PRC created a program in 1982 that provided 
funding for Tibetan children to study in the Eastern parts of China. This program 
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provided rural or poor Tibetan children the opportunity to receive a proper education 
with all of the necessary materials and strong teachers. This is evidence of a soft power 
policy because the government provides Tibetan children with an opportunity to get a 
good, inexpensive education. The compromise is that these Tibetan children must travel 
and live in Eastern China for many years and cannot return home until the schooling is 
done. The Chinese government hopes by this time Han culture leaves a positive 
impression on these Tibetan students. 
Even with the formation of a school system within Tibet, the 1990 Census 
calculated that 44.43% of Tibetans over the age of fifteen were illiterate, only 0.57% of 
Tibetans received a college education, only 2.12% received a high school education, only 
3.85% received a middle school education and only 18.6% went to primary school 
(Grunfeld, 1996: 226). These figures are extremely low and the government truly 
wanted to increase the literacy rate among Tibetans.  The Chinese government 
designated 1993 as the “Tibetan Education Year” and the Chinese press wrote that 67% 
of all school-age children were enrolled; however, the unbiased press wrote that poor 
transportation, few schools and poor conditions made the number lower (Grunfeld, 
1996: 226). In 1994, the Chinese government stated they pumped 21.5 million RMB into 
education within the TAR. 
However, some scholars argue that the education in the TAR schools focus less 
on providing a broad education and focuses more on teaching Tibetan children why 
Chinese occupation is good for their country. John Heath wrote that education today is 
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more focused with “political indoctrination” than with preparing the students to 
succeed in the future and become productive members among society. For instance, 
Heath also provided an interesting quote from a CCP member regarding China’s goal for 
the TAR education: “The success of our education does not lie in the number of 
diplomas issued to graduates from universities, colleges…it lies, in the final analysis, in 
whether our graduating students are opposed to, or turn their hearts to, the Dalai clique, 
and whether they are loyal to…our great motherland” (Heath, 2005: 22). The Tibetan 
schools spend more time making the children read quotes by Mao Zedong and studying 
the policies of other Chinese leaders. Once again, this is evidence of a soft power policy 
used to influence the mindset of young Tibetan children. By teaching the children at 
such a young age the ideals and morals of Communism, the children may grow up with a 
more Han biased nature. 
The Chinese government focuses much of their attention on improving the 
education system within Xinjiang and Tibet. The two main goals are to give minority 
students a better education and to introduce Han culture. Beijing approaches education 
policies with ease and uses soft power policies because the education system does not 
pose a threat to the government. Since schools are government provided, Beijing has 
complete control over the education system. 
                                                                       Language 
The Chinese government uses soft power policies when dealing with language 
issues to covertly assimilate the minority groups into one unified state by teaching 
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Mandarin. Like in most countries, there are enormous gains for residents who can speak 
the dominant language; therefore, this provides great incentives for minorities to learn 
Mandarin. This creates the idea that Mandarin is more important and more useful than 
minority languages which allows the Chinese government to proceed with even more 
language policies that favor Mandarin. 
Another reason that the PRC feel safe using soft power policies is because there 
are no limits placed on how many languages a person can learn or use. Since the 
minority groups are able to speak their native tongue, there is not as much unrest. Also, 
the government believes that minorities will not protest for the right to speak their 
language more freely. This idea stems from the fact that there are few organized groups 
or schools that support this notion of freedom of language. Therefore, there are no 
distinct leaders to lead any campaigns. Unlike religious groups, there is no freedom of 
language groups for citizens to connect with and belong to. This is because many 
organizations form because of specific ethnicity groups rather than solely for a common 
language. This lack of organization gives the PRC a sense of comfort and relief. The 
Chinese treat “religion and language as separate. It claims that language has not played 
a significant role in the emergence of violent militant actions organized by some 
religious groups” (Reny, 2009: 494). Finally, even though the PRC push the usage of 
Mandarin on all minorities to unite these groups into one nation, they do not feel that 
these minority languages are an obstacle to modernity and social advancement like they 
view religion. 
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The Chinese government has placed great importance on the preservation of 
minority languages. The Political Consultative Conference in 1949 declared that the 
People’s Democracy shall be the foundation for the national construction of the PRC. 
This Conference created a document called the Common Program which included 
Article 54 that stated simply that national minorities should have “freedom to develop 
their dialects and languages, and to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and 
religious beliefs.” (Dwyer, 2005: 7). However, this statement is extremely vague and 
does not include specific examples as to how these languages are to be preserved. 
According to Dwyer, this statement forgets to mention the fact that along with these 
preservation policies, the major minority languages in China’s Autonomous Regions are 
required to “share space and resources with Standard Chinese in the domains of 
government administration, the courts, education, and the media” (Dwyer, 2005: 7). 
Regardless, the Chinese government has implemented many different language policies 
within their Autonomous Regions to promote and preserve minority languages. 
Whether the preservation of these languages was actually the main goal of these 
policies is unknown. 
The 1980’s were a period of enormous expansion of support for minority 
languages. Beijing and local governments established and revised different writing 
systems and created many new language materials and programs. In 1984, Article 37 of 
the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy stated that 
“schools where most of the students come from minority nationalities should, whenever 
possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use these languages as the media of 
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instruction. Classes for the teaching of Chinese (the Han language) shall be opened for 
senior grades of primary schools or for secondary schools to popularize Putonghua, the 
common speech based on Beijing pronunciation.”6 The local governments were 
instructed to give financial support to the compilation, translation, and publishing of 
teaching materials and publications in the languages of minority nationalities (Dwyer, 
2005: 35).  Article 38 encouraged literature, arts and news to be spoken and written in 
the minority language. This Article also supported the publication of nationality books 
and the preservation of nationality historical and cultural heritage (Dwyer, 2005: 11).  
Article 46 guaranteed “the citizens of every nationality the right to sue in their own 
nationality spoken and written language in carrying out litigation” (Dwyer, 2005: 11). 
Article 49 states that “cadres of Han nationality should learn the spoken and written 
languages of the local minority nationalities”. However, most scholars note that hardly 
any Hans learn more than “hello” (Dwyer, 2005: 33). By allowing the use of minority 
languages, the PRC is able to show their leniency and tolerance for minority cultures. 
Since the PRC allows the minorities to speak their native tongues, the Chinese 
government uses this as a compromise to also introduce Mandarin. The early PRC 
language policy “was part of a broader economic and social development plan, which 
aimed to establish a new system of governance and society while also, crucially, building 
national unity” (Dwyer, 2005: 7). The implementation and promotion of Mandarin 
entailed massive propaganda campaigns to increase minority exposure to the standard 
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Chinese language and reinforced the notion that the minority languages were not as 
important as Mandarin.   The PRC’s language policies are a soft power policy in general 
because the government uses incentives and persuasion to influence the minority 
nations to speak and write Mandarin. By placing incentives like job opportunities for 
those who speak Mandarin, the government is able to exert their control and influence 
in a non-aggressive manner. Specific language policies in Xinjiang and Tibet reflect this 
idea that China’s government implements soft power policies to push the use of 
Mandarin on the minorities. 
The early stages of PRC language policy in Xinjiang were lenient. From 1954-1986, 
Beijing established a language planning office called the Chinese Committee on Script 
Reform, later renamed the National Language and Script Working Committee. In Urumqi, 
the local branch was named the Autonomous Region Language and Script Working 
Committee. This committee employed linguists to reform the region’s Arabic-based 
scripts and published a flagship journal called “Language and Translation” in the five 
major languages of Xinjiang (Chinese, Uighur, Kazak…) (Dwyer, 2005: 16). Creating a 
special committee to develop and protect a minority language is a soft power policy 
because it shows signs of equality and gave the minority groups a reason to appreciate 
the government. 
However, after the reform era of the 1980’s, the PRC began implementing 
language policies that leaned towards the importance of instructing Mandarin over the 
Uighur language. Although the use of minority languages for classroom instruction is 
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protected by the Chinese constitution, “the CCP promulgates the use of Mandarin in all 
social realms, and proficiency in Mandarin is a must for all minority students pursuing a 
college education” (Grose, 2010: 99). The Xinjiang Education Commission has gradually 
reduced Uighur-language instruction in all levels at school. Now Chinese is the language 
of instruction, and Uighur is looked upon as the second language (Dwyer, 2005: 38).  In 
March, 2004, the Xinjiang Daily announced, “the CCP and regional government have 
decided that ethnic minority schools must be merged with ethnic Chinese schools and 
ethnic minority students must be mixed with ethnic Chinese students. Teaching should 
be conducted in Chinese language as much as possible…some small towns and counties, 
where conditions are ripe, must start teaching Chinese to first-grade ethnic minority 
students in primary school” (Dwyer, 2005: 38). Schools were used as the greatest 
integration tools for the minorities to become “hanified”. At the same time, teaching 
Mandarin to children at such a young age provides these students with a better 
opportunity to succeed later in life economically. Young Uighur students are exposed to 
Han culture, language, clothing, fads and other modern elements that can potentially 
influence a young Uighur to think Han culture is cooler. Combining Uighur and Han 
students into one schooling system is a great example as to how the PRC use soft power 
policies to try and integrate minorities into Han culture through subtle cultural 
persuasion. 
Whether the ultimate goal of the PRC is to push the use of Mandarin on the 
Uighur or to preserve the Uighur language and culture is not clearly defined. However, I 
believe that by accommodating the Uighur’s linguistic claims in Xinjiang, the Chinese 
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government is able to sneak in a linguistic compromise that includes teaching Mandarin 
as well. By incorporating Mandarin into the daily lives of the Uighur, some scholars fear 
the Chinese language could possibly replace the use of the Uighur language. There is 
also the possibility that the Uighur will utilize both languages and will have the benefits 
of keeping their cultural identity and gaining more economic opportunities. According to 
Marie-Eve Reny, “the bilingual education policy appears to be an indispensable 
bargaining tool in the eyes of the central government” (Reny, 2009: 503). 
The Uighur adults are exposed to the same subtle persuasions that Han culture 
and language are more important through networks of media and scholastic elements. 
Adults are influenced by Han culture and language since Xinjiang’s newspapers, the 
Xinjiang Daily and People’s Daily, are translations from Chinese editions of these 
newspapers. All cinema and television are legally required to be made into the Chinese 
language. If a film is designated for Xinjiang, then it will be dubbed into the Uighur 
language (Dwyer, 2005: 49).  Beginning in 1999, all TV and radio broadcasts reduced 
their full Uighur language broadcasts to a maximum of eight hours per day; Mandarin is 
used for the other 16 hours of the day (Dwyer, 2005: 49).  Since adults are no longer in 
school, they are not provided with as many opportunities to learn Mandarin as the 
young Uighur students. By incorporating Mandarin into media sources, the Uighur 
adults are exposed to the language in a way that gives them a chance to hear Mandarin 
every day. The Uighur adults may want to learn Mandarin as well to improve their living 
standards. 
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The “final step to monolingualism” was made in September of 2002, when it was 
decided that Xinjiang University would no longer offer courses in the Uighur language; 
even Uighur poetry is now taught in Mandarin (Dwyer, 2005: 40).  All university 
educators are required to have a high degree of competence in Mandarin (Dwyer, 2005: 
40). Dwyer claims that the Uighur perceive this change to “monolingualism” as a cultural 
attack and has done the opposite of the PRC’s goal of integration because of resentment 
(Dwyer, 2005: 41). Blaine Kaltman, author of the ethnography, Under the Heel of the 
Dragon: Islam, Racism, Crime, and the Uighur in China, noted that “although many 
Uighur accept the need to learn Mandarin as a prerequisite to the kind of education that 
will enable them to get a good job and have a better lifestyle, a large number of Uighur 
simply do not want to learn a language they consider to be imposed upon them by an 
alien regime” (Kaltman, 2007: 16). Kaltman illustrates the difficulty of Uighurs learning 
Mandarin by comparing how an Italian can learn Spanish more easily than Russian with 
the Uighur finding it easier to learn the languages of Central Asia than Mandarin. The 
Uighur language looks and sounds completely different than Mandarin, resulting in even 
more frustration for the Uighur population. Of the Uighur Kaltman interviewed in 
Urumqi, 65% resented the fact that they needed to learn to speak Mandarin in order to 
succeed financially (Kaltman, 2007: 16).  Dwyer acknowledges the main issue of 
preserving minority languages for the PRC by commenting that “for modern China, 
which advertises itself domestically and internationally as a ‘unitary multi-ethnic 
Chinese nation,’ transnational linguistic solidarities are potentially threatening to the 
concept of nationhood” (Dwyer, 2005: 31). To the PRC’s dismay, many Uighur feel that 
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the government has not addressed their language concerns and this may result in 
actions of resistance (Reny, 2009: 505). 
Tibet also faces similar obstacles in regards to the PRC’s language policies. In 
Tibet, there was also a time of progressive thinking in regards to the preservation of the 
Tibetan language. In the early 1980’s, written and spoken Tibetan was adopted as the 
primary language in all legal matters (Grunfeld, 1996: 217). In 1983, Yin Fatang, the 
former top official of the TAR, ordered that all cadres under the age of 50 learn to speak 
Tibetan and that all government documents should be written in Tibetan (Grunfeld, 
1996: 218). By stating that both the Tibetan language and Mandarin operate equally, 
there is evidence that the PRC are trying to appeal towards the Tibetan people by 
“allowing” them to speak their native tongue, but are at the same time pushing the 
usage of Mandarin in everyday life. This is clearly an example of how the PRC language 
policy is a soft power because it is a slow and gentle transition towards 
“monolingualism”. 
The Tibetan language was promoted within the education system as well. Books 
used for instruction within the schools were to be written in the Tibetan language 
(Heath, 2005: 23). Tibetan and Han children attended the same schools and by the late 
1970’s, the children were instructed to learn each other’s languages and their classes 
were taught in both languages. In 1976 Epstein observed that “on the playground, as 
they ran about together they communicated in one tongue or the other, or a mixture of 
both. We found it hard to distinguish them by nationality” (Epstein, 1983: 338).  By 
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learning the Chinese language as well as furthering their own native language, the 
Tibetan children have more opportunities to get jobs in the future since there is a large 
Chinese presence in the TAR. However, today, the teaching of the Tibetan language is no 
longer a priority. From 1997 and on, grade one and up had to be taught in Chinese and 
the only course to be taught in Tibetan was to be a “Tibetan language” course (Heath, 
2005: 22). Today, the Tibetan student enrollment is much smaller than China as a whole 
because the children struggle with learning Mandarin. According to Robert Barnett, the 
TAR Congress in May 2002 ordered that the Tibetan language should be protected; 
however, “these regulations only operate on a more theoretical level” (Barnett, 2008: 
196). For example, the CCP ordered that there should be more children and science 
books written in Tibetan. The influence these books have on preserving the Tibetan 
language is next to nothing when Chinese is the working language and all street signs 
are written in Chinese. The importance placed on the Chinese language makes it 
extremely difficult for Tibetan students to go far in school and most of the time these 
students feel as if they are less important than their Chinese peers. This gives Tibetan 
students more of a drive to learn Mandarin so they do not have to experience any 
discrimination. 
Similar to Xinjiang and the Uighur nationality, the PRC eventually changed their 
language policies to more Han intensified. Within Tibet, Chinese is the working language; 
therefore, all street signs are written in Chinese and all formal letters must be written in 
Chinese (Heath, 2005: 23). If a Tibetan wants to find a steady job within Lhasa or other 
major cities within Tibet, they must be able to comprehend Mandarin since all of the 
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companies are now Han companies. The PRC has proceeded with caution in regards to 
its language policies within Tibet. By allowing some usage of the Tibetan language, the 
government has not completely destroyed the language. The PRC use their “leniency” as 
a way to compromise and order the usage of Mandarin as well. This is a soft power 
policy because the PRC slowly eliminates the usage of Tibetan without being obvious. By 
replacing Mandarin as the language of instruction in schools, making the Tibetan road 
signs written in Chinese and providing incentives for those who comprehend Mandarin, 
the PRC are persuading the Tibetan people that Mandarin is the language to know in 
order to succeed financially. 
The Chinese government utilizes soft power policies when dealing with language 
to unify the Uighur and Tibetans with the rest of Chinese society. Assimilation is very 
important to the Chinese because two of their main goals when dealing with minority 
nationalities are unification and national security. Beijing believes that by teaching 
Mandarin to young minority students and adults, these minority citizens will have more 
opportunities in life to succeed. Also, if most citizens speak one language, a nation will 
feel more unified in general. The CCP feel that soft power policies are the proper way to 
achieve the government’s goals of assimilation. Beijing uses soft power policies because 
language does not pose a serious threat to the government’s objectives. The first reason 
is that there are no limits as to how many languages a person can speak.  Secondly, 
there are no organized groups fighting for language freedom that minority citizens can 
pledge allegiance to or challenge the government’s authority. 
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                                                               Religion 
The PRC fears religion for many reasons and this fear drives all hard power 
policies implemented on both the Uighur and Tibetans. First, the PRC are weary of 
religion because there are hundreds of distinct religious organizations, like monasteries, 
that have a massive amount of followers. The Chinese government is afraid that the 
people will begin to rely on these organizations for services that the government should 
be providing; for example, providing food for the hungry, an education and monetary 
assistance. The PRC are afraid that citizens will profess their allegiance to these 
organizations and that the organizations will undermine their authority. Religious 
organizations also produce strong leaders that can influence the minds of the people. 
For example, in Tibet, the Dalai Lama is the most influential spiritual leader and most 
Tibetans are loyal to only him. 
Second, Chinese Communist ideology believes religion is a backwards tradition 
and criticizes religion on the basis that it prevents the people from reaching modernity 
and progress. Grunfeld argues that Chinese Communists believe that religion prevents 
or distracts people from becoming rich because they spend their money on religious 
objects or donate money to religious organizations; “some poor people donate so much 
to the monasteries that they become welfare recipients; others are kept in perpetual 
poverty” (Grunfeld, 1996: 227). For this reason, the Chinese government tries to 
eradicate religion so that the citizens can focus on monetary development. 
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Third, the Chinese government understands that religion is the unifying measure 
for both the Tibetan and Uighur identity and can create separatist thoughts. Religion is 
considered by the CCP to be an obstacle to national integration and a potential source 
of local nationalism. Finally, the issue of national security is a big issue for the Chinese 
government and any signs of separatism or terrorism are a threat. It is difficult for the 
CCP to disassociate Islam and Tibetan Buddhism with political instability and separatism. 
For these four main reasons, the PRC implement hard power policies to control the use 
of religion within the XAR and TAR. 
When the PRC declared both Xinjiang and Tibet as Autonomous Regions of China, 
they promised to preserve the culture and religion of the minority nationalities. In Tibet 
specifically, the PRC pledged not to alter the existing political and religious system when 
they wrote Article Four of the Seventeen Point Agreement; the document created in 
1951 that secured Tibet as an Autonomous Region. Article Four also states that “the 
Central Authorities will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the 
Dalai Lama” (Heath, 2005: 99). However, the PRC did not uphold this statement and the 
Tibetan’s religious leader, the Dalai Lama, has been deemed a terrorist by the Chinese 
government and stripped of his power. The Dalai Lama now lives in exile in India and can 
never return to his native land. By removing one of the largest aspects of Tibetan 
Buddhism, the objectives and goals of the PRC in regards to religion are clearly not 
preservation.  In Xinjiang, the PRC also promised to preserve the culture, identity and 
religion of the Uighur. However, the Chinese government has used the worldwide fear 
of Muslim terrorists as a way to try to eradicate the Muslim faith from the Uighur 
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population.7 Why does the Chinese government dislike religion so much? Communist 
ideology in general does not believe in religion and finds religion to be a backwards 
notion. This ideology stresses that religion prevents societies from achieving 
modernization and progress. Religion is perceived as traditional and a tool of class 
oppression in Marxist thinking. It is for this reason and many others that the Chinese 
government has stepped up and cracked down on the freedom to practice religion in 
China. The practice of Islam in Xinjiang and the practice of Tibetan Buddhism in Tibet are 
no exception. The hard power policies on religion implemented in the XAR and TAR 
greatly restrict religious freedom. 
Tibet’s culture is based off of Tibetan Buddhism. Buddhism has influenced every 
aspect of Tibet since the introduction and popularization of the religion as practiced by 
the 33rd King of Tibet in the 7th century A.D. Tibetan Buddhism is the prime characteristic 
that makes up the Tibetan identity and prevents the Tibetans from truly assimilating to 
Han culture. The Chinese government uses hard power policies because religion is the 
key component to the Tibetan identity and there is a fear that this will unify the Tibetan 
people to fight for their independence. This is one of the reasons that Tibetan Buddhism 
has been continuously under attack since the 1950’s. 
The attack began when the Chinese government replaced the Dalai Lama and 
created an alternative base of power and authority within the TAR. The Chinese 
government still fears that the Tibetan people pledge allegiance to the Dalai Lama. 
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Between 1950 and 1980 the CCP destroyed more than 6,000 monasteries and temples 
and by the end of the 1970’s, a total of only eight monasteries were still open and 
operating in Tibet, with less than one thousand monks still practicing. The other 
monasteries that survived China’s Cultural Revolution were converted to places for 
nonreligious use (Laird, 2006: 354). Thomas Laird stated “to decimate the monasteries 
was to strike at the heart of Tibetan culture” (Laird, 2006: 354). In addition, many of the 
adobe images of the Buddha were destroyed with pickaxes and the statues made out of 
copper were smashed and thrown into the river. The statues made of precious metals 
were shipped to China and used as monetary value (Laird, 2006: 346). Communists 
believe that religion prevents and distracts people from making money because they 
spend all of their earnings on religious icon statues, objects for religious festivals and 
towards rebuilding and supporting monasteries. This is a prime example for the PRC’s 
claim that religion prevents growth and progress. The Communist ideology that religion 
is bad for society creates even more of a reason to place hard policies on religious 
freedom. The Chinese government has implemented many different hard power policies 
to destroy Tibetan Buddhism and the role of religion for the Tibetan people. 
In 1994, Chinese-dominated Democratic Management Committees (DMC’S) 
were set up to replace the traditional authority of abbots and lamas. Since committee 
members are selected by the local branches of the Beijing-based Religious Affairs 
Bureau, the Tibetan people have no say on what goes on in the XAR. The DMC’s restricts 
the amount of monks and nuns at each monastery and enforces the entry level age to a 
minimum of 18; the common age of entry prior to Chinese occupation was 7 (Heath, 
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2005: 18). Today, leading lamas are forced to retire at the age of 60, a prime time 
because of the wisdom they have gained throughout the years; this prevents “the direct 
teaching of their wisdom to the young”(Heath, 2005: 18). The youth of Tibet have also 
been prevented from learning the principles of Tibetan Buddhism because the teaching 
of religion is prohibited in school. 
The government also controls how average day citizens practice their faith. 
Tibetans are not allowed to have religious artifacts, butter lamps, or pictures of the 
Dalai Lama in their homes. These numerous bans are examples of hard power policies 
because they are inflexible restrictions with a clear objective. During searches of 
citizen’s homes by the police, altars, religious paintings, butter lamps and statues have 
been confiscated and thrown away (Heath, 2005: 20). When a group of foreign 
journalists were traveling in Tibet during the 2000’s, they were asked by many Tibetans 
if they had pictures of the Dalai Lama in books and if they could see them briefly. The 
intensity to see images of the Dalai Lama clearly illustrates their lack of religious 
freedom. Today, if a Tibetan is caught watching a video of the Dalai Lama or has pictures 
of the Dalai Lama within their home, they are condemned to six years of imprisonment 
(Heath, 2005: 19). Using Imprisonment as a way to enforce the ban on Dalai Lama 
images is clearly an example of a hard power policy because it is a form of punishment. 
In 1995, a Buddhist nun named Chuying Kunsang (19 years old) shouted “Free Tibet” on 
a street in Lhasa and was sent to the notorious Drapchi Prison for five years. Once she 
was released, she escaped to the West and told her story. She was given flyers in prison 
with China’s version of Tibetan history. She was told to write a report on Tibet’s history 
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and since she did not agree with the “facts,” she was tortured three or four times a year. 
Chuying said that “they wanted to brainwash me about history, and they used torture to 
do it” (Laird, 2006: 369). They put electric cattle prods on her hands, lips, behind and 
cheeks. This system is a clear example of propaganda enforced with torture. Chuying 
said that the Chinese guards “set up this system so that after the torture the prisoners 
would agree that Tibet was always a part of China” (Laird, 2006: 369). 
The Chinese government also denied the Tibetan people a very important 
religious tradition when they chose a different Panchen Lama (second highest ranking 
Lama after the Dalai Lama) than the one recognized by the Dalai Lama. The real Panchen 
Lama (who was chosen by the Dalai Lama) and his family are nowhere to be found. The 
Panchen Lama chosen by the CCP is from the same village as the real one, but the “fake” 
Panchen Lama’s parents are recognized members of the Communist Party. This is 
evidence that the Chinese government is trying to undermine Tibetan tradition and the 
Dalai Lama as a spiritual leader (Grunfeld, 1996: 244). In regards to the Chinese choice 
for Panchen Lama, Chen Kuiyan, the Communist Party Secretary of the TAR in the 1990’s, 
quoted that “a qualified religious leader should, first of all, be a patriot. Any legitimate 
religion invariably makes patriotism the prime requirement for believers. A person who 
is unpatriotic…cannot be tolerated by religion” (Heath, 2005: 19). The Chinese 
government fears any religious leader because of their popularity among the people. By 
replacing the real Panchen Lama with their own choice, the government is able to 
control the actions of this religious leader. The PRC has no reason to fear a religious 
leader under their control. The Chinese government has placed deliberate attacks on 
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Tibetan Buddhism and the Dalai Lama as a spiritual leader. According to John Heath, 
“the underlying problem for the Chinese is that Buddhism unifies all Tibetans and in 
adversity it helps to encourage in them a sense of nationhood. It is the living symbol of 
Tibet as a whole and its culture” (Heath, 2005: 20). This “living symbol” is what Beijing 
fears about religion in Tibet and it encourages the government to use hard power 
policies to eradicate religion. 
As of today, five to six hundred Tibetans are believed to be detained for 
nonviolent expression of their political or religious beliefs. There is no knowledge of the 
real number of prisoners because China does not allow any outsiders to visit its prisons 
on a regular basis. The average sentence for “political prisoners” in custody at the end 
of 1998 was seven years, but some Tibetans arrested for peaceful protests were serving 
much harsher sentences. Many prisoners also face torture, beating, unfair trials, 
detention and isolation. From the time Tibetans are taken into custody until their 
eventual release, they may be held in police lockups, municipal or county detention 
centers, labor camps, prisons…etc. Many of these peaceful protesters never see a 
courtroom and are never given the chance to fight for their rights. China’s Criminal 
Procedure Law permits police to detain and hold a suspect for months while an 
investigation is carried out; most of the time these “investigations” were never 
completed (Aaronson, 2000: 146). According to Jeffrey Aaronson, “at present, silence, 
prison, or exile are still the only options for Tibetan dissidents” (Aaronson, 2000: 168). 
These are clear examples of hard power policies because the government is using force, 
punishment, and scare tactics to try and destroy religion. 
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The Uighur identity is greatly linked to Islamic traditions and faith, and has never 
fully assimilated into Chinese culture in the same way that many other minority 
nationalities in China have. The cultural differences been the Uighur and Han have 
spurred the growth of Islamic nationalism in Xinjiang which presents a real challenge for 
Beijing. Beijing has created hard power policies to eliminate the importance of Islam 
within the Uighur culture. According to Hierman, “the intensified level of state 
repression in the region encouraged the formation of organized clandestine groups able 
to carry out violent targeted actions against the state” (Hierman, 2002: 51). Within the 
XAR, the Chinese government focuses on protecting national security and unifying the 
nation. The Chinese response to contentious religious events is the placement of hard 
power policies to eradicate the Muslim faith. 
Beginning in the 1980’s, the Chinese government focused on limiting the contact 
between Muslims in Xinjiang and the broader Islamic world. The Chinese government 
feared that the Uighur would associate themselves with the other Muslim nations and 
have separatist thoughts. In order to limit communication with other Muslim nations, 
the CCP in 1988 established that only hajj applicants aged 50 and older are allowed to 
go to Mecca on a pilgrimage. In addition, no Chinese citizens are given permission to 
study in either Iran or Pakistan (Craig-Harris, 1993: 121). These restrictions also included 
forbidding meetings between Muslim clerics and foreigners; as well as forbidding 
foreign preachers from entering Xinjiang. The bans placed on communicating with 
neighboring Muslims are a hard power policy because it is an inflexible restriction. The 
Chinese government has also prohibited the teaching of sensitive subjects such as the 
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doctrine of jihad, a Muslim holy war against everyone that is not Muslim (Craig-Harris, 
1993: 121).  Another subject never discussed is Uighur history for fear that it could stir 
separatist thoughts because there is debate as to whether China has rightful claims to 
the land and people of Xinjiang. 
The 1990’s placed greater restrictions on Islamic education, and even the 
construction of mosques. Many of these restrictions spurred massive riots and protests; 
many of which became violent. For example, in April 1990, a riot broke out in the town 
of Baran because the entire town was angered by the sudden closure of a mosque. 
When the town rose in a rebellion against the Chinese, 50 pro-independence Uighur 
rioters were killed by police gunfire. The Chinese police say that they were secretly 
training for a “holy war” against the Han and were going to use weapons obtained from 
fellow Islamic members in Pakistan (Craig-Harris, 1993: 118). After this riot, “8,000 
officials in rural work teams were dispatched…to stabilize the border regions and 
strengthen political organizations.” This action took place to weaken the Islamic 
organizations and strengthen the state’s control of Xinjiang (Hierman, 2002: 52). 
The numerous amounts of riots in the 1990’s forced the government to enforce 
the Strike Hard campaign in 1996. This campaign is a great example of a hard power 
policy in that it was considered a severe religious repression campaign. This campaign 
was in response to Uighur nationalism and many executions and arrests resulted from 
this campaign. The Strike Hard campaign also created a massive propaganda campaign 
to link Uighur nationalists with the Al-Qaeda terrorists. Officials also announced that all 
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Islamic publications now needed state approval (Hierman, 2002: 56). This campaign and 
other drastic policies have deepened many of the Uighur’s hatred towards the Han. The 
“intensified level of state repression in the region encouraged the formation of 
organized clandestine groups that were able to carry out violent targeted actions 
against the state” (Hierman, 2002: 51). After September 11, 2001, the number of arrests 
increased sharply because of the fear of Islamic terrorism and Beijing pushed even 
further the massive propaganda campaign to tie the Uighurs to Al-Qaeda.8 The CCP 
claimed that more than 1,000 Uighurs had traveled to Afghanistan to train with Al-
Qaeda and other Islamic groups (Kurlantzick, 2004: 141). According to Reny, the post-
September 11th United States war on terrorism has “encouraged China to pursue its 
Strike Hard campaign against nationalist and separatist religious militancy in Xinjiang,” 
and has “further legitimized its repressive actions by linking them to the US war against 
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan” (Reny, 2009: 510). One of China’s most 
important goals as a nation is national security and because of the world wide war on 
Islamic terrorism, the Chinese government has placed stricter policies on the use of 
religion in Xinjiang. 
Today, the Chinese government focuses much of their attention on eradicating 
the Islamic faith from the Uighur in Xinjiang. The PRC go about this process with hard 
policies that essentially discriminates any Uighur engaged in religious activity. No Uighur 
citizen can be a CCP member if they attend prayers or religious instruction. This means 
                                                          
8
 "“9•11”八周年，中国呼唤《反恐法》." Xinhua: 新华网. 11 Sept. 2009. Web. 20 Oct. 2011. 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2009-09/11/content_12033506.htm>. 
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that no Muslim Uighur can participate in the government or the decision making 
process on the different policies implemented in Xinjiang. The Uighur population 
encounters “discrimination against those engaged in religious practice” and this 
discrimination “has been maintained in the Chinese job market” (Reny, 2009: 508). 
Different forms of pressure are put on Muslim Uighurs in order to discourage them from 
engaging in customs considered “Islamic” or practice their religion. Public sector 
employees are not allowed to wear clothing marked as religious, such as coverings for 
women or embroidered skullcap for men. The Muslim Uighur population “cannot find a 
job in the state or state-sponsored sectors of the Xinjiang economy” (Reny, 2009: 509). 
By creating discrimination against those who practice Islam, the Chinese government 
creates a monetary incentive for the Uighur to not practice religion. Any form of 
purposeful discrimination is a hard power policy based on the emotional trauma and 
economic difficulties for those who experience the discrimination. 
The government has also conducted severe monitoring of religious activities in 
Xinjiang.  The CCP requires all Islamic organizations and places of worship to register 
with the Religious Affairs Bureau in Beijing (Kaltman, 2007: 127). Uighurs under the age 
of 18 are not allowed to receive any kind of religious instruction. In addition, all Islamic 
texts are under state control. The Ulama’s, the Muslim clergy who are trained in the 
study of Islamic sciences, are also controlled by Beijing (Reny, 2009: 509). Kaltman 
interviewed many Uighur in the capital city of Xinjiang, Urumqi, about the subject of 
religious freedom. Kaltman determined that “of the Uighur I interviewed in Urumqi… 82% 
responded negatively when asked about religious freedom in China. This negative view 
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was uniformly held by men and women of all ages, single and married, professional and 
nonprofessional alike”  (Kaltman, 2007: 43). Kaltman also noted that most Uighur in 
Urumqi today only pray within their hearts as opposed to the mosques because of the 
need to do business for money and that they feel uncomfortable going to the mosques 
(Kaltman, 2007: 45). When Kaltman asked the Uighur in Urumqi about praying, religion, 
and mosque attendance, most Uighur “were completely unwilling to discuss it and 
seemed genuinely upset that I wanted to” (Kaltman, 2007: 52). According to Gladney, 
“China’s Muslims are clearly the most threatened in terms of self-preservation and 
Islamic identity” (Gladney, 2003: 451). 
Religion is not favored in a Communist/Marxist society and the Chinese 
government wants to erase religion from Tibet and Xinjiang to assimilate the minority 
groups into Chinese society and to protect national security. There are numerous 
reasons as to why the Chinese government fears religion. One of the main reasons the 
PRC are afraid of religion is because they are nervous that minority citizens will pledge 
alliance to religious groups and will not be loyal to the Chinese nation. In order to 
prevent possible separatist thoughts, the government has implemented hard power 
policies. These hard power policies use force, bans and scare tactics to enforce Beijing’s 
main goal of eradicating religion. 
                                                  Conclusion 
The Chinese government is greatly concerned over the minority nationalities and 
whether these groups will assimilate to Chinese society because Beijing fears any signs 
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of threats to national security or separatism. The CCP believe if the minority groups 
were to assimilate to Chinese society, there may be fewer threats. Beijing must carefully 
approach their main goal of assimilation with minority nationalities in order to avoid 
discontent among the minority groups. This balancing act of trying to achieve Beijing’s 
main objective without angering the minority nationalities is an extremely difficult task. 
The PRC has implemented many different policies in various realms in hopes of 
achieving a unified nation without encountering problems with the minority groups. I 
looked at education, language and religious policies specifically to show how the 
government is using these realms to accomplish their goals. Within these realms, I argue 
that Beijing uses a distinction between soft and hard power policies. 
Soft and hard power policies are used by the PRC strategically. The government 
uses soft power policies when there is little to no threat to national security or signs of 
separatism. Hard power policies are used when the government feels there are 
possibilities of threats to the nation. Soft power policy techniques include positive 
incentives, subtle persuasion, flexible laws and more covert objectives. Hard power 
policy techniques include strict bans, clear restrictions, force, punishment, inflexible 
laws, and less covert objectives. In China, education and language policies are soft 
power for multiple reasons. One reason that education policies are soft power is 
because the government has complete control over the education system. One example 
as to why language policies are soft power is because there are no restrictions on how 
many languages a citizen is allowed to speak. One main reason that religious policies are 
hard power is because Beijing fears minority citizens will proclaim allegiance to an 
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organized religious group that could undermine the government’s authority. These 
different policy realms seem to clearly indicate that Beijing uses different tactics 
depending on the government’s view as to whether something is a threat or not. The 
Chinese government implements these policies to achieve their goals of assimilation and 
the protection of a unified nation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
 
43 
 
                                                       Appendix  
  Year                  Month                            Protest Description                                           Premeditated 
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(Hierman, Brent. “The Pacification of Xinjiang, Uighur Protest and the Chinese State, 1988-2002”,             
Problems of Post-Communism, May/June 2007. M.E. Sharpe Inc., pg. 48-61) 
A list of riots and protests within Xinjiang from 1988-2001. This chart outlines when and where 
the riots occurred and whether there was premeditated violence or not. There was at least one 
riot every year from 1988-2001 in Xinjiang.  
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